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any relief. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, the supreme court, in remanding for a new trial, held
that such evidence would afford a substantial basis for the con-
clusion that defendant used more explosive than was reasonably
necessary in order to operate his caliche pit, even though there
was no direct evidence of the amount of explosives used.
The Texas courts have usually excluded opinions of witnesses
as to carelessness as being mixed questions of law and fact-ques-
tions concerning which the jury is in as good a position as the
witness to form an opinion. 7 The true theory of the opinion rule
is simply that superfluous evidence should be excluded.2" When
as to an activity of a highly technical nature a witness has acquired
special knowledge, skill or experience, and is therefore in far
better position than the jury to draw conclusions from the facts,
the opinion of that witness is certainly not superfluous. In such a
case there can be no sound reason for excluding the opinion of
the witness, even though to admit it is tantamount to allowing the
expert to testify that defendant was negligent.
Tom Dilworth.
Richard B. Perrenot.
FAMILY LAW AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY
POWER OF COURT TO MODIFY DECREE FOR ALIMONY
BASED UPON AGREEMENT OF PARTIES
Arkansas. In Bachus v. Bachus1 the wife had previously obtained
a divorce from her husband, the decree incorporating a written
contract between the parties settling their property rights and
providing for the payment of alimony and child support to the
wife in the amount of $200 per month. The trial court approved
an application from the husband requesting that the alixnony
payment be reduced to $150 per month. On appeal, the supreme
27 MCCORMICK AND RAY, op. cit. § 647.
281d. § 625.
1216 Ark. 802, 227 S. W. 2d 439 (1950).
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court ruled that the trial court had erred in reducing the amount
of the monthly payment, holding that the court had no power to
modify the decree inasmuch as it incorporated a contract between
the parties providing for payment of alimony.
At common law there was no power to modify a decree granting
an absolute divorce,2 but most states, including Arkansas, now
have statutes giving the courts power to modify the provisions for
alimony and child support whenever changed circumstances render
the terms of the original decree inequitable.' Whether or not the
decree may be modified when it incorporates an agreement of the
parties is in conflict, the majority rule apparently being that, where
a court has the general power to modify a decree for alimony or
support, the exercise of the power is not affected by the fact that
the decree is based upon an agreement entered into by the parties
to the action.4 The Arkansas court recognizes this general rule but
makes a distinction between decrees based upon "agreements as to
the amount the court by its decree should fix as alimony" and
"agreements for the payment of alimony," allowing alteration of
the former,5 but denying modification of the latter.6 As the agree-
ment in the Bachus case came within the latter group, the court
refused to allow its alteration. The validity of this distinction was
questioned in the case of McCue v. McCue,7 where it was character-
ized as "judicial hairsplitting."
The parties to a divorce action are faced with a choice of three
possible courses of action in providing for payment of alimony:
(1) They may make an agreement providing for alimony pay-
ments, but choose not to have it incorporated into the decree. For
enforcement of the agreement, the parties are relegated to an ordi-
nary contract action, and do not have available the remedy of
2 MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS (1931)
328.
.P ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 34-1213.
4 Note, 109 A. L. R. 1068 (1937).
5 Holmes v. Holmes, 186 Ark. 251, 53 S. W. 2d 226 (1932).
6 Pryor v. Pryor, 88 Ark. 302, 114 S. W. 700 (1908).
7 210 Ark. 826, 197 S. W. 2d 938 (1946).
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contempt proceedings. The courts are without power to modify a
contract of this kind.
(2) They may make no agreement, allowing the court to make
whatever provision is proper under the circumstances. This pro-
vision may be enforced by contempt proceedings and may be
modified by a court having general power to modify decrees.
(3) They may make an agreement and have it incorporated into
the decree. This course is a combination of (1) and (2) and has
characteristics of both. Since there is an agreement between the
parties, the court should be without power to modify the agreement
so as to prevent the parties from enforcing it by an ordinary
contract action. So far as the award may be enforced by contempt
proceedings, however, it should be subject to modification by the
court which granted the award upon showing of changed circum-
stances. This modification would not alter the contract made be-
tween the parties, which could still be enforced by contract action.8
The reported decision is said to be grounded upon the principle
that courts may not modify contracts voluntarily entered into be-
tween parties. However, failure to make the required payments
may amount to contempt of court, resulting in possible punishment
by imprisonment. The Bachus case disposes of this problem by
observing that "if changed circumstances should subsequently
render the payments inequitable the court may decline to enforce
by contempt proceedings the payment of a greater sum than the
circumstances warrant."9 This answer seems insufficient in that it
forces the husband to undergo the risk of contempt proceedings
rather than allowing him to obtain a judicial declaration that
changed circumstances have made the payment of the original
amount as alimony inequitable. It would seem more logical to
permit the wife to retain her remedy at law to recover the balance
due under the contract, but to relieve the husband from undergoing
the risk of contempt proceedings in order to determine whether the
original amount decreed has become inequitable due to changed
circumstances.
8 For a case in which the above analysis is made and reasoned out in detail see
Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. 2d 265 (1940).
9 227 S. W. 2d at 440.
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CHARGEABILITY OF WIFE'S ATTORNEYS' FEES AGAINST HUSBAND
Texas. In Carle v. Carle1 the wife instituted suit for divorce
against her husband, and sought recovery of $6,500 attorneys' fees
against the defendant. In granting the divorce, the trial court
charged the $6,500 attorneys' fees against the husband's interest
in the community property. The court of civil appeals reversed
that part of the judgment charging the attorneys' fees against the
husband's interest in the community and rendered judgment charg-
ing them against the community estate as a whole on the ground
that the wife's attorneys' fees are necessities chargeable against
the community estate as a matter of law. On submission of cer-
tified questions, the supreme court answered that the court of civil
appeals had erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court, the
attorneys' fees being but a factor to be considered by the court in
making the equitable division of the estates provided for by
statute.11
Texas courts have uniformly justified charging attorneys' fees
against the husband on the theory that the fees incurred by the
wife are necessaries.12 Application of this theory of recovery ap-
parently led the court of civil appeals to the conclusion that such
recovery should be against the community estate as a whole. The
supreme court regarded this approach as improper when judgment
is rendered in a suit granting a divorce and dividing the properties
of the parties. Article 4638 of Texas Revised Civil Statutes (Ver-
non, 1948) provides that "the court pronouncing a decree of di-
vorce shall also decree and order a division of the estate of the
parties in such a way as the court shall deem just and right." This
statute gives the trial court discretion in dividing the estates of the
parties and does not require an equal division of the community
10 ------------ Tex ------------- , 234 S. W. 2d 1002 (1950), rev'g 234 S. W. 2d 907 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950).
11 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4638.
12 15 TEx. JUR., Divorce and Separation, § 155, p. 654.
13 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4621 Iwovides that the community estate
shall be liable for necessaries. In the reported case the court mentions the rule that
necessaries are primarily the obligations of the community and secondarily of the hus-
band's estate.
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between them.14 For this reason it is immaterial whether the attor-
neys' fees be looked upon as necessaries inasmuch as the entire
property is subject to whatever division is deemed to be just and
right.
The supreme court's decision on this point should settle the
conflict noted in the decisions of various courts of civil appeals
when the issue is raised in a suit in which a divorce is granted and
a division of property made.15 Certainly, Article 4638 furnishes
ample support for the court's approach to the question. However,
the court does not deny the validity of the theory that the fees are
necessaries; thus, the theory will probably continue to be applied
to justify recovery against the husband in other cases in which a
divorce is not granted, or in which no property settlement is made.1"
LIABILITY OF CROPS GROWN ON WIFE'S SEPARATE PROPERTY TO
DEBTS CONTRACTED BY HUSBAND
Texas. In Bearden v. Knight,'7 a divorce suit instituted by the
wife, the Hereford State Bank intervened for the purpose of fore.
closing a chattel mortgage lien given by the husband on crops grown
on a farm adjudged to be the wife's separate property. The chattel
mortgage was executed as security for a note given the bank by the
husband, and the note was a community indebtedness. The trial
court ruled that inasmuch as the crops were community property
and the debt a community indebtedness, the mortgage gave the bank
a valid lien; whereupon judgment was rendered foreclosing the
lien. The judgment was affirmed by the court of civil appeals, but
was reversed and rendered in favor of the wife by the supreme
court.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the court of civil
appeals reasoned that inasmuch as the crops were community prop-
14 In a comment, Settlement of Marital Property Rights Upon Divorce, 29 Tex. L
Rev.. 355 (1951), the application of Article 4638 is reviewed in some detail and its
development as an effective but piecemeal substitute for an alimony statute is described.
15 This conflict is noted and cases on both sides are cited in the opinion of the court
of civil appeals, 234 S. W. 2d at 916.
16 Roberts v. Roberts, 144 Tex. 603, 192 S. W. 2d 774 (1946).
ST_ _.Tex_., 228 S. W. 2d 837 (1950), rev'g 224 S. W. 2d 273 (Tex. Civ..
App. 1949).
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erty and were not within that group of items of community property
exempted from liability for the debts of the husband by Article
4616 of Texas Revised Civil Statutes (Vernon 1948), they were
governed by the general rule that community property is liable
for a community indebtedness.
The basic statute exempting certain items of community property
from liability for the debts of the husband is Article 4616:
"... neither the separate property of the wife, nor the rents
from the wife's separate real estate, nor the interest on bonds
and notes belonging to her, nor dividends on stocks owned by
her, nor her personal earnings shall be subject to payment of
debts contracted by the husband nor of torts of the husband."
It will be noted that only rents from the wife's separate real estate
are exempted. The supreme court indicated that the word "rents"
used in a broad sense could include crops, but preferred not to rest
its decision upon this ground. Thus, Article 4616, the basic ex-
emption statute, was not relied upon to relieve crops grown upon
the wife's separate realty from liability for the debts of the husband.
The court preferred to base its decision upon Article 4614 of
Texas Revised Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1948) giving the wife con-
trol and disposition of her separate property and the application of
that statute made in the case of Hawkins v. Britton State Bank."8 As
indicated by the court, the earlier statutory provision giving the wife
control and disposition of the rents and revenues from her separate
property was eliminated by the 1929 amendment to Article 4614, so
that there is at present no express statutory provision to this effect.
However, the decision in the Hawkins case implied such a power
from the portion of Article 4614 which gives the wife control and
disposition of her separate property, reasoning that a construction
of that statute as conferring on her the bare right to control and
manage the land itself, and as permitting the husband to take
charge of the rents and use them to suit himself, "would saddle the
wife with all the burdens incident to the management of her estate
18 122 Tex. 69, 52 S. W. 2d 243 (1932).
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but rob her of all benefits, and render the statute an idle and a vain
thing."' 9 Thus, as incident to the right of control and disposition of
her separate land, the wife is given the right of control and dis-
position of the crops grown on that land, and these crops cannot be
subjected to the payment of debts contracted by the husband.
In deciding this case the court overruled First National Bank of
Lewisville v. Davis,2" which held that the husband had the power to
mortgage cotton grown on the wife's separate land to secure a com-
munity indebtedness. The court chose instead to rely upon the rea-
soning of the Hawkins case. In doing so, the court evidenced con-
tinued approval of this controversial case and its liberal point of
view toward the rights of the wife in connection with the fruits
derived from her separate property. Critics of the Hawkins case
point out that it fails to distinguish properly between these fruits
and property subsequently acquired by their expenditure. While
this defect in reasoning is recognized, it is nevertheless believed
that the court's liberal interpretation of Article 4614 is a proper
one. The division of managerial responsibility over marital property
and its liability for debts along the lines indicated by these decisions
is a natural one and seems to carry out the legislative intention
evidenced by the Act of 1913.21
The court in the reported case confined its decision to the liability
of revenues from the wife's separate land to debts contracted by
the husband. It remains to be seen whether the same decision will
be reached with respect to revenue from the wife's personalty other
than that provided for by Article 4616, but there is reasoning in
the opinion which indicates that the supreme court may "find that
the present statutes exempt from the husband's debts and commit
to the wife's exclusive management all varieties of revenue from
her separate property, real and personal."2
19 Id. at 74, 52 S. W. 2d at 245.
20 5 S. W. 2d 753 (Tex. 1928).
21 Tex. Acts 1913, c. 32, p. 61. In Huie, The Community Property Law of Texas,
VEmNoN's TEX. CIV. STAT. ANN., V. 13 1951), p. VII, this legislative scheme is
outlined and some of the mishaps besetting the scheme are discussed.
22 Huie, supra note 21, at XXXIX.
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VALIDITY OF WIFE'S AFFIDAVIT SWORN TO BEFORE HER ATTORNEY
Texas. Ex parte Nix" involved habeas corpus proceedings to de-
termine the validity of an order adjudging the relator in contempt
of court for failure to comply with a judgment ordering him to con-
tribute $25 per month to his divorced wife for child support. The
complaint forming the basis of the contempt hearing was sworn
to by the divorced wife before her attorney. Relator contended that
the order of contempt based upon such a complaint was void. In-
voking Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 308-a, effective March 1,
1950, the supreme court held that inasmuch as such complaints no
longer need even be verified, the complaint was not void because
verified before the affiant's attorney.
Prior to the adoption of Rule 308-a, Texas courts followed the
rule that a contempt order based upon a complaint verified before
the affiant's attorney was void and subject to collateral attack by
writ of habeas corpus, regardless of whether such contempt order
grew out of civil or criminal proceedings. This rule was first an-
nounced by the supreme court in Ex parte Scott,24 in which it
reasoned that contempt proceedings are criminal in nature because
they involve the essential idea of wilful disobedience of judicial
orders or decrees. Reasoning from the rule in criminal cases that
the attorney for the accused is incompetent to take affidavits filed
therein, the court held that the attorney for the accuser, the divorced
wife, was also incompetent to take an affidavit to be used in the case.
It was argued that the affidavit should be taken under circumstances
that would subject the affiant to the pains and penalties of perjury
and that it would be difficult to see how this could be done where
the affidavit is taken by the affiant's own attorney. The rule has
been uniformly applied to invalidate contempt orders in which
the wife complaining of her ex-husband's failure to make child
support payments verified the complaint before her attorney.25
Rule 308-a is a new rule promulgated October 12, 1949, to take
2 -------.-..-. Tex ------------- 231 S. W . 2d 411 (1950).
24 133 Tex. 1, 123 S. W. 2d 306 (1939).
25 Ex parte Freeman, 144 Tex. 392, 191 S. W. 2d 6 (1945) ; Ex parte King, 135 Tex.
296, 143 S. W. 2d 580 (1940).
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effect March 1, 1950. The portion of the rule applied in this case
provides as follows:
"In cases where the court has ordered periodical payments for the
support of a child or children . ., and it is claimed that such order
has been disobeyed, the person claiming that such disobedience has
occurred may file with the clerk of the court a written statement de-
scribing such claimed disobedience, which statement need not be veri-
fied." (Emphasis supplied.)
The adoption of this rule has made the rule of Ex parte Scott in-
effective in cases in which the divorced wife is complaining of the
failure of her former spouse to make child support payments as
directed. Inasmuch as no affidavit is required, it is immaterial that
the affidavit was verified before the affiant's attorney.
Among the changes in rules tentatively adopted by the supreme
court this spring is an amendment to Rule 30 8 -a which may restore
the rule of Ex parte Scott if finally adopted.2" This proposed amend-
ment deletes that portion of the rule which provides that the com-
plaint need not be verified. In its place is a provision that upon
application of the divorced wife, the court may appoint an attorney
to advise with and represent her. If the attorney in good faith be-
lieves that the order of the court is being contemptously disobeyed,
it shall be his duty to file a written statement, verified by the wife's
affidavit, describing the disobedience. The court may then issue an
order to the husband to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court. The reason for this proposed amendment to the
rule is the considerable volume of unverified complaints which are
filed under the rule as it now stands, imposing upon the courts the
difficult task of determining which of the complaints have merit.
The proposed amendment would have the effect of placing upon
the Bar the duty of screening these complaints in an effort to aid
the court in the decision of such cases. It may be doubted whether
this is a function that the Bar properly should be called upon to
perform, since the attorney is called upon to state his own opinion
as to the merits of his client's claim, a function which ordinarily
26 Proposed Civil Rule Amendments, 14 Tex. B. J. 307 (1951).
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attorneys are not permitted to perform." In any event, the rule
as finally amended should be so worded as to make it clear that
the contempt proceedings will not be void even if the affidavit filed
by the wife is verified before her attorney.
WAIVER OF RIGHT OF APPEAL BY ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS
Texas. In Carle v. Carle2 the property settlement provided for
by the divorce decree adjudged three items of realty and the furn-
ishings thereon to be the wife's separate property, two of which
were subject to offsets in favor of the husband in the amount of
one-half of the community funds used to pay off obligations against
these properties. The offsets were charged against the wife's interest
in the community estate, and a commissioner was appointed to sell
the community estate and distribute the proceeds. The husband
filed formal notice of appeal, objecting to the court's finding that
the properties were the wife's separate estate. Before the appeal
was decided, the commissioner sold the community property and
distributed a portion to the husband at his request in order that he
might use the funds in his business. The court of civil appeals held
that as to the two properties against which there were offsets, the
husband had waived his right to complain of the judgment, but that
as to the other he had not. The portion of the judgment that had not
been waived was reversed and remanded for a new trial. In answer
to certified questions, the supreme court held that the husband had
waived his right to complain of the judgment as to all of the
properties.The supreme court recognized the general rule that a litigant
who accepts benefits under a judgment cannot thereafter appbal.29
It further recognized the exception to this rule which provides that
the appeal may be allowed where reversal of the judgment cannot
possibly affect the appellant's right to the benefits already ac-
27 "It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument hi; personal belief in his
client's innocence or in the justice of his cause." American Bar Association, Canons
of Professional Ethics (1948), Canon 15..
2 -............-Tex -------------- 234 S. W. 2d 1002 (1950), rev'g 234 S .W. 2d 907 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950).
29 Matlow v. Cox, 25 Tex. 578 (1860).
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cepted. 0 The question for decision in this case was whether or not
the exception was applicable. The court held that it was not.
In refusing to allow the appeal, the court reasoned that should
a reversal of the judgment result in a new trial, the court would
be under a duty to divide the estates of the parties. Such division
could result in an award to the wife of a portion of the properties
already sold. The proceeds of these sales having already been dis-
tributed to the husband, such an award would require that the hus-
band return all or part of the proceeds paid to him. Since this
forced return would "affect the appellant's right to the benefits
already accepted," the case did not fall within the exception noted
by the court and was controlled by the general rule denying the
right of appeal after acceptance of benefits.
The development of the general rule applied in this case and
a review of the situations in which some courts have attempted to
modify its rigor are presented in a recent annotation.31 It seems
well settled that a litigant cannot appeal from a judgment if the
appeal could result in putting in issue his right to the benefits ac-
cepted. This rule is generally applied even if financial hardship
will result from the fact that the litigant must await the outcome
of the appeal before accepting the benefits which have already
been awarded him. 2 The decision of the court in this case is well
supported by authority, since it is apparent that a new trial would
again put in issue the defendant's right to the money already paid
him, because of the discretion allowed the court in dividing the
marital property when a divorce is decreed.3 It appears that some
relaxation of the rule is desirable when financial need makes it
necessary that the litigant accept the benefits of the judgment in
order to keep himself in business-a situation which might often
occur in divorce cases such as this. If the husband had been
awarded the filling station which he had been operating as his
business, and had desired to appeal from some other portion of
the judgment, apparently he would have been faced with the choice
30 Citing 2 AM. JuR.,Appeal and Error, § 215, p. 977.
31 169 A. L. R. 985 (1947).
32 Id. at 1066.
31 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4638.
